I think it's hard to argue with the idea that Iran has come out strengthened.

They now have a source of leverage in the Strait of Hormuz that in some ways is much more powerful than any leverage that their nuclear program ever gave them.

Hello and welcome to GZERO World.

I'm Ian Bremmer.

Some stories move so fast that they become almost impossible to see clearly.

In the Iran war, every day has brought another headline, another military strike, another diplomatic breakthrough, another collapse in negotiations.

Since February 28th, more than 7,300 people have been killed in Iran and Lebanon, according to official figures from those governments.

The dead include hundreds of children and dozens of health care workers, with scores more killed elsewhere across the region.

And even if you've been glued to each new development or each Trump Truth Social post, and I'm truly sorry if you have, you would be forgiven if you feel like you understand this war even less than when it began.

And I'd wager that's also the case for the Iranians that are living through it.

What has life been like for the 90 million people inside Iran?

They tend to be highly educated.

They're cosmopolitan, as we saw in last year's protests and ensuing government crackdown, incredibly brave.

And yet Iran remains one of the world's most tightly controlled societies.

Internet access has only recently been restored after a nearly three-month blackout, and penalties for speaking out today may even be harsher than before Ayatollah Khamenei was killed.

Yeganeh Torbati is the Iran correspondent for The New York Times and co-author of Stolen Revolution: Betrayal and Hope in Modern Iran.

The book is built on more than five years of reporting and interviews across Iranian society in which she traces how the hopes of the 1979 revolution quickly gave way to repression, economic hardship, and competing visions for the country's future.

Our conversation goes beyond the battlefield.

We talk about why many Iranians who oppose the regime now feel disappointed and betrayed, whether the government emerged from the war stronger than before, and why the economy remains the greatest challenge to the Islamic regime.

We also talked about what ordinary Iranians still hope might come next.

She joins me from Istanbul.

Don't worry, I've also got your puppet regime.

His name is what?

Balogun?

And he's American?

But first, a word from the folks who help us keep the lights on.

Funding for GZERO World is provided by our lead sponsor, Prologis.

Every day, all over the world, Prologis helps businesses of all sizes lower their carbon footprint and scale their supply chains.

With a portfolio of logistics and real estate, and an end-to-end solutions platform, addressing the critical initiatives of global logistics today.

Learn more at prologis.com.

And by Cox Enterprises is proud to support GZERO.

Cox is investing in the future, working to create an impact in advanced recycling and in emerging technology companies that will help shape tomorrow.

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Additional funding provided by the Andrew Carnegie Foundation, Koo and Patricia Yuen, committed to bridging cultural differences in our communities, and... >> Yeganeh Torbati, thanks so much for joining us today.

>> Thank you so much for having me, Ian.

We've spent so much time talking about the Strait of Hormuz, spent so much time talking about the deal, the memorandum.

There's been much less talk of the 90 million Iranian people who, I mean, should be the focus.

I mean, of those that you're talking to now, what are they thinking about the war, about what their country looks like coming out of it?

Yeah, I mean, look, obviously, as you mentioned, it's 90 million people.

There's sometimes 90 million different views on events.

But I think, for a lot of Iranians, this war didn't actually start in late February, when the U.S.

and Israel attacked.

It really started in January for them, and in particular January 8 and 9, when hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of Iranians came out onto the streets to protest and to, in large part, to demand a new form of government.

And what they saw was a government that responded to them, really with military-grade weapons, killing thousands of people in response.

And ever since then, I think they have felt like a lot of Iranians, not all, but certainly sort of this deep desire for the government to change, for some people, almost at any cost.

And so for some portion of Iranians, when the war began in late February, there was a hope that perhaps, even at great cost, this may lead to a better country, a better outcome eventually for them.

And I think for a large portion of those Iranians, they feel a great sense of disappointment and even betrayal at what has actually occurred and kind of what the regime has been able to gain out of this war in the last few months.

Now, as you say, millions were on the streets, and these weren't armed citizens.

They obviously understood the risk that they were taking because they've seen this playbook before from the Islamic Republic.

Why, months later, are we not seeing any more demonstrations?

Why are we not seeing the kind of outrage to a regime that has proven that it can and will continue to be very brutal towards its own people?

And the economic suffering, of course, has only gotten worse through this period.

You're absolutely right that it's nothing new for the Islamic Republic to use violence to suppress protests.

But I do think the scale of what we saw in January was orders of magnitude worse than even some of the most brutal responses in the past.

Even if we take kind of the most conservative estimate of the number of killings, around 6,500, which has been verified by one human rights group, that is still quite a bit more than previous rounds of protests in 2017, 2019, back in 2009 or 1999.

So I think there is a sense of trauma, shock, great fear still lingering in the last few months.

And then the regime has also gone to great pains to make very clear that it controls the streets.

During the war itself and even a few weeks after the initial ceasefire in April, there were kind of nightly street rallies where supporters of the regime would come out with loudspeakers and music and chants, just kind of making clear that, you know, don't even think about protesting if you're against this government.

There have been these huge rallies for different events.

You know, so it's been made very clear to opponents of the government that they have no place in Iran's public square right now.

However, as you mentioned, the economy, which was the spark of these protests back in late December, has only continued to get worse.

And I don't see right now that changing.

And I believe that we're going to continue to see certainly discontent.

And historically in Iran in the last decade, that has often led to street protests and demonstrations.

President Trump, at the beginning of this war, was very focused on the demonstrations, was very focused on all of the Iranians that were killed, tens of thousands, according to the Trump administration.

I certainly don't have an exact number.

You don't either.

But it was pretty widespread.

He said that he was going to rescue the Iranian people.

He said, help is on the way.

Finally, to the great proud people of Iran, I say tonight that the hour of your freedom is at hand.

When we are finished, take over your government.

It will be yours to take.

Did the Iranian people believe him?

You know, I think some portion of Iranians did, particularly, you know, often the people who are protesting are young people.

They are 16, 17, 18 years old.

And the people that we saw killed often were quite young.

And so, you know, that's a generation that in any country is less jaded, is less cynical, maybe one could say is more naive, and has less experience of the world.

And so the idea that an American president would come out and say that, you know, help is on the way, we're locked and loaded, I think that generation, and then even among some people who were older and kind of had more experience in the world, I think a lot of people assumed, well, certainly something's going to happen.

I mean, no person, no president would simply say something like that and be so really specific if they didn't actually intend to do something.

And so I think, you know, I wrote about this at the time in January, and then later on, you know, there is just this, amongst some Iranians who believe what Mr.

Trump, what President Trump said, a sense of betrayal that, you know, that promise really wasn't fulfilled.

Since the war started, we've certainly seen a lot of propaganda from the Iranian regime.

All of these billboards that show that the Strait of Hormuz has been seized and grabbed by the Iranian regime.

I mean, if I were just watching that, you'd think this is a government that looks a lot stronger and they were able to stand up to the Americans that hit them.

But, of course, they've also taken not just significant military blows, but also significant economic blows to an economy that already wasn't performing.

They've taken significant leadership blows.

And a lot of the people that are now in positions of power don't have a lot of experience, don't have a lot of capacity.

So I could frame a story that says that this is a stronger regime domestically.

I could frame one that says that actually they're much more vulnerable now.

How do you come out on that?

I think it's important to look kind of at the short to medium term and then potentially the long term.

So in the short term, I think it's hard to argue with the idea that Iran has come out strengthened and certainly more confident.

They now have a source of leverage in the Strait of Hormuz that in some ways is much more powerful than any leverage that their nuclear program ever gave them, because it's real, it has an immediate impact on the world economy.

And as we saw in President Trump's comments regarding why he had agreed to the memorandum, it really can induce world leaders to make concessions to the Iranians because they don't want the global economy to crash.

So I think it's really hard to kind of look at that set of circumstances and not conclude that Iran has come out ahead.

Also, you know, the outcomes that each side was hoping for were quite imbalanced.

So, you know, the U.S.

came in wanting perhaps regime change or at least wanting, you know, destruction of Iran's nuclear sites, ballistic missiles, conventional military, all of these things.

For the Iranians, what they really needed to show that they were victorious domestically and then also to kind of their followers or supporters in the region was simply to survive and to survive against kind of two of the most powerful militaries in the world.

And they have shown that they have done that.

In the medium or maybe long term, I think there's real challenges.

The major parts of the infrastructure have been completely destroyed.

The economy is really in shambles, even more than it was in December.

They're seeing overall inflation of 70 percent, according to estimates.

And potentially for food inflation, it's getting into the triple digits, unemployment, all sorts, all of these kind of really structural problems happening.

And then at the same time, we're kind of seeing at least some fractures within the regime even now over sort of what the future should be, first of this memorandum and kind of any agreement with the United States, and then overall kind of do we let in foreign investments in order to grow or is that a threat to the principles of the regime?

And I think a lot of that is going to be playing out in the next few months and even years.

So it's really hard to tell right now kind of what that future holds.

But my sense is that once this kind of, this sort of high of the post-war victory period passes, Iranian policymakers and leaders are going to have to actually turn to governing, and that's something that's going to be much more difficult for them.

I mean, when the U.S.

and when Israel targets civilian energy infrastructure, and some of that, of course, was done, and the Iranian people suffer on the back of that, or when there is a school, for example, that's hit, and investigations apparently believe that was a mistake, but by the United States, and all these young girls are killed, is that something that is increasing support for this regime, however brutal, at the expense of the U.S.

and the Israelis that are attacking the regime?

But of course, the Iranian people are also getting hit.

- It's really complex, right?

So there are plenty of Iranians who are so opposed to this government, to the Iranian government, but are really quite horrified at the conduct of the U.S.-Israeli side in this war, and in particular the strike that you mentioned in Minab on a school there, and also strikes on civilian infrastructure like steel plants and energy facilities that really just affect millions of people and the broader economy.

I don't know that that translates necessarily into greater support for the government, for the Iranian government, but it certainly translates into almost a sense of disgust, I feel -- I sense sometimes from some Iranians towards the U.S.

You know, but it's also complicated.

People also have a sense of pride and some patriotism and nationalism.

And even if they oppose this government, there may be a part of them that also, you know, is almost a little bit proud that, OK, well, we weren't able to be taken over by a foreign system or a foreign government.

So, I think Iranians are feeling a very confusing mix of emotions right now, and really nothing has been simple or easy for them, certainly this year and certainly not over the last few years.

So, Ali Khamenei, the former supreme leader, I guess he was 86 years old when he was killed, his son not seen much at all in public, and certainly, if anything, has more of a chairman role than that of an acting leader.

I mean, if it's the military, if it's the IRGC, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, that are more in control now, and if, at least in the near to medium term, they're exporting oil, the US is trying to normalize relations with them.

Is there a scenario here where this government becomes less overtly repressive, less theocratic, and economically starts to perform for a larger percentage of its citizens?

I think, you know, there's a lot of different scenarios.

I think it's possible that this government, you know, full of sort of Revolutionary Guard generals who seem to be more in power now than before, perhaps becomes more pragmatic and perhaps also, you know, pursue some form of economic development.

At least, you know, right now they're getting greater receipts from oil sales.

Maybe that strengthens the Iranian Rial and it kind of makes life a little bit easier for the Iranian people.

That does not necessarily go hand in hand, though, with being less repressive.

So the person that Vice President Vance has been negotiating with at times is Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the speaker of Parliament, IRGC general.

And he is someone who has, like, from time to time tried to present himself as sort of a more modern guy, you know, wearing suits in his presidential campaigns, and, you know, not sort of like an old-fashioned cleric.

However, he's also been one of the harshest and kind of most enthusiastic supporters of crackdowns on the Iranian people as well during their times of unrest, going back to 1999 and 2009 as well.

So there may be a scenario in which Iran's government in five years has dialed down quite a bit on kind of the religious aspects and maybe has allowed for -- at least restricted its nuclear program enough to continue to be able to sell its oil.

But I don't think that necessarily translates into sort of greater political liberties or freedom of speech for the Iranian people.

The Iranian people, a lot of them, and certainly I've spoken with many, very supportive of active policy of regime change at the beginning of this war.

That is not where we are today.

Trump made very clear the economic catastrophe that would pursue if the US continued with its boycott of the Strait.

What would the Iranian people want going forward?

I mean, now that the Americans have given, with the Israelis have given this a shot and essentially failed at so many of their war goals, what's the right strategy for the Iranians going forward?

- I think, you know, again, it's hard to speak for tens of millions of people.

And we have to recognize that there are some portion of Iranian society that do still support this government, you know, maybe 12 to 15 million people who continually vote for hardline candidates in the presidential election.

And therefore we can kind of assume they are sort of the most loyal supporters of this government.

The Iranian people's dissent, at least from the research I have done for my book and in my reporting, that doesn't appear to me like it's going to go away, unless this government is able to somehow really address the most fundamental problems that the Iranian people face.

And the heart of that is the economy.

That's been the main issue they've struggled with in terms of delivering on since, really, the revolution.

And it has continued and worsened up to today.

And so if somehow this government is able to address that, then I think some portion of Iranians will be happy to live perhaps without political freedom, but at least having economic freedom.

And there's many, many millions of Iranians who that would not be good enough for.

But at least up to now, we have not seen this government in particular be able to sort of set aside its policies towards the United States, its policies in the region, and kind of look for a new approach that might enable the trillions of dollars in foreign investment that Iran needs, according to experts, to really be able to reach its full potential and kind of rejoin the globalized world.

And if I had to ask you why they've not been able, and we look at the plausible explanations, incompetence, corruption, malfeasance, and sanctions, how would you prioritize those?

I think one big issue is just simply an ideological one.

So we have to remember this revolution, this government came into power kind of in the middle of a century in which Iran had been economically exploited by world powers.

That was kind of part of Iran's 20th century history.

Even the tobacco concession in the early 1900s, this was sort of in living memory for the people who staged the revolution.

And when this government came into power, one of their big focuses was self-sufficiency.

We're not going to rely on the West or the East.

That strain has really continued.

And we saw the former Supreme Leader Khamenei emphasize that.

Now, a lot of what happened or was justified using that argument of self-sufficiency was corruption and the taking and sort of hoarding of resources by particular entities, mostly the Revolutionary Guards, but also these big foundations that are controlled by the clerics.

- A final question I wanted to ask you is, when this war started, one of the first things that the Iranian government did was shut down the internet.

And that's not surprising.

We see that with a lot of repressive regimes, but they've since reopened it.

And at a time where, again, the economy's still doing badly and the ceasefire's in place, but there's still a lot of fighting, skirmishing that's going on.

That implied to me a level of confidence on the part of this government that we can allow our people, who are pretty educated and have a sense of what's going on, to communicate with each other and also to hear from Western journalists of what's going on.

How do you take that?

How do you read that?

- I think partially that's true.

They felt like they had the domestic scene under control.

They had been able to prevent any real protests from occurring during the war itself, and they had maintained control and kind of scared people.

And then, also, there was just the economic reality.

I mean, we saw Iran's tech sector, which was kind of, at one point, one of the most vibrant sectors in Iran, really suffering, undergoing layoffs, some companies shutting down.

And they needed the Internet.

And then a large portion of Iranians make their living on Instagram, whether that's advertising their businesses there or selling services or taking orders for their businesses, whatever it might be.

That had all been cut off for months.

And so I think there was some necessity as well in the government reopening the Internet.

But of course, they've also shown that they don't -- that's not their priority when it comes to what they believe is their -- is the self-preservation.

If they feel like having open Internet and having people being able to communicate with each other in the outside world is a threat, they will shut that down, no matter the economic costs to the country.

Yeganeh Torbati, thanks so much for joining us today.

Thank you so much for having me, Ian.

And now to a regime that has all the absurdity of a repressive theocracy, but none of the bronze statues.

I've got your puppet regime.

His name is what?

Balogun?

And he's American?

Well, then what's happened with him is a big problem for our country, and we're going to reverse it very strongly.

Guys, get the legal team.

We're going to the Supreme Court.

His name is what?

Balogun?

And he's American?

Well, then what's happened with him is a big problem for our country, and we're going to reverse it very strongly.

Guys, go get lunch.

I'm going to call up Infantino.

Boy, even after all that, Belgium still beat us 4-1.

4-1?

Fellas, get the tariffs ready.

The United States of America will no longer stand for this very unfair treatment by chocolate and Brussels sprouts, which frankly, no one likes anyway.

That's our show this week.

Come back next week and if you like what you've seen, or even if you don't, but you genuinely have nothing better to do, why don't you check us out at GZEROmedia.com.

(upbeat music) Funding for GZERO World is provided by our lead sponsor, Prologis.

Every day, all over the world, Prologis helps businesses of all sizes lower their carbon footprint and scale their supply chains.

With a portfolio of logistics and real estate and an end-to-end solutions platform, addressing the critical initiatives of global logistics today.

Learn more at prologis.com.

- And by Cox Enterprises is proud to support GZERO.

Cox is investing in the future, working to create an impact in advanced recycling and in emerging technology companies that will help shape tomorrow.

Cox, a family of businesses.

Additional funding provided by the Andrew Carnegie Foundation, Koo and Patricia Yuen, committed to bridging cultural differences in our communities, and... [music]